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APPLICATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE SECTION 103(c)* TO VARIABLE RATE
DEMAND BONDS: PURGING THE
PROFITEERING POTENTIAL
I. Introduction
In recent years, high and fluctuating interest rates in the bond
market precipitated a creative surge in tax-exempt finance.' Investors
were clamoring for shorter-term instruments and issuers were grum-
bling about exorbitantly high long-term interest costs. 2 Ingenious
investment bankers responded by developing the variable rate demand
bond (VRDB), a new form of long-term tax-exempt instruments that
do not carry the fixed interest rates traditionally associated with
long-term tax-exempt debt.' One feature common to these instruments
is a provision for varying the interest rates.4 In addition, the holders
are given "put" rights5 designed to insure that they can dispose of
the instruments at par value whenever the interest rate changes. 6
As the variable rate demand bond market has grown, 7 however,
counsel involved in these financings have faced the need to interpret
* On October 22, 1986, as this Note was in its final stages before going to
press, President Reagan signed into law legislation that comprehensively revised the
tax laws of the United States. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,(to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Because the
substance of the prior law referred to in the Note is largely in keeping with
the amendments, and the examination of the prior law may well facilitate an
understanding of the new law, the author has based this Note almost entirely on
the'law prior to amendment by Pub. L. No. 99-514. See infra note 164 and
accompanying text for a discussion of some of the more salient aspects of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 as it relates to this Note.
1. Andrews, The Creative Surge in Tax-Exempt Finance, INST. INVESTOR, Dec.
1984, at 211, col. 1 [hereinafter Creative Surge].
2. Id.
3. Winterer, "Reissuance" and Deemed Exchanges Generally, 37 TAX LAW.
509 (1984) [hereinafter Reissuance].
4. Id.
5. For a more detailed discussion of this put option and what it entails, see
infra notes 27, 40-44 and accompanying text.
6. Reissuance, supra note 3, at 509.
7. A tremendous expansion has occurred during the past four years in the
portion of the "new issue" tax-exempt bond market comprised of variable rate
demand bonds. Roughly 40% of the tax-exempt debt issued in 1984 carried floating
rates and put options, as compared to less than 5% in 1981. See Creative Surge,
supra note 1, at col. 3. Variable rate demand bonds (VRDBs) were originally used
for industrial development financings, but, since 1983, this financing technique has
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provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that were enacted
before VRDBs were common.' The IRC contains many requirements
that must be satisfied in order for the interest on bonds to be
exempt from federal income taxes. 9 In particular, IRC section 103(c)
restricts the extent to which an issuer or beneficiary10 of an exempt
bond may profit by investing the proceeds of the bond in higher
yielding, taxable obligations." Currently, some question has arisen
over whether VRDBs satisfy the requirements of IRC section 103(c)
concerning arbitrage bonds.' 2
This Note analyzes transactions involving VRDBs, to determine
whether they comply with the strictures of IRC section 103(c) and,
hence, qualify for the tax exemption.13 Initially, this Note provides
an overview of the tax-exempt bond market by examining the factors
gained wide acceptance in municipal, multi-family rental housing, hospital and
university financings. See Watterson, Variable Rate Bonds: A Flexible Tool, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 26, 1985, at 17, col. 1 (citing Bond Buyer, June 11, 1985, at 4) [hereinafter
Flexible Tool].
8. Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 17. Variable rate municipal debt with a put
feature is a relatively new innovation in the tax-exempt market. Instruments com-
bining these two features began to appear in the bond market sometime after 1981.
See Creative Surge, supra note 1, at 211, col. 3. The relevant Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) subsections were enacted well before this time. See infra note 66 and
accompanying text.
9. The exemption for interest paid on municipal bonds is found in § 103(a),
which provides that "[g]ross income does not include interest on-;(l) the obligations
of a State ... or any political subdivision of ... the foregoing . . . ." I.R.C.
§ 103(a) (1985). Subsections (b)-(o), and their corresponding regulations, enumerate
myriad requirements that the obligations must meet in order to qualify for the
exemption. See generally I.R.C. § 103(b)-(o) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7 (as
amended in 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8 (as amended in 1983); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.103-9 (as amended in 1977); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10 (as amended in 1986);
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-11 (1972); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-12 (1972).
10. In an industrial development bond financing, it is a private entity-the
underlying obligor (not the issuer)-who will ultimately benefit from a tax-exempt
financing. See infra note 20.
11. See I.R.C. § 103(c) (1985); infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
12. See Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at cols. 1-2 (it has proven difficult to
calculate the yield on VRDBs for purposes of arbitrage requirements). The deter-
mination of yield on variable rate obligations has been the subject of much confusion.
For a general discussion of some of the interpretive problems that arise, see Rogers,
Public Comments on Proposed Regulations, Hawkins, Delafield & Wood Asks For
Clarifications And Transitional Safe Harbor in Regulations (Sec. 103) (available
Apr. 30, 1985, on LEXIS, FTX library, 85 TNT 86-49) [hereinafter Clarifications
in Regulations]; Section Of Taxation, American Bar Association, ABA Comments
On Investments In Nonpurpose Industrial Development Bonds Under The 1984 Tax
Act (available Jan. 31, 1985, on LEXIS, FTX library, 85 TNT 23-90) [hereinafter
as ABA Comments].
13. See infra notes 20-174 and accompanying text. The analysis focuses primarily
on the implications of IRC section 103(c)(2)(A). See infra notes 66-114 and ac-
companying text.
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that led to the development of VRDBs.' 4 It then demonstrates how
a reasonable interpretation of the language of IRC section 103(c),
gleaned from its legislative history and Treasury promulgations, 5
requires that almost all VRDBs lose their tax-exempt status. 16 More
specifically, this Note concludes that the inability to calculate the
yield for VRDBs creates an impermissible potential to earn arbitrage
profits. 7 Based on this conclusion, this Note suggests that it is
incumbent upon the Treasury Department to issue regulations that
will limit the tax exemption for transactions involving VRDBs.'8
Finally, this Note proposes measures that delineate the proper scope
of the tax exemption for VRDBs and incorporates them in a model
Treasury Regulation.19
I. The Development of VRDB Financing
From the outset, it is important to recognize that VRDBs are not
a genre of debt obligations distinct from industrial development
bonds20 or bonds issued to finance activities associated with traditional
municipal functions.2' Nor are VRDBs a species of either of these
14. See infra notes 20-49 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
the concerns which led to the enactment of IRC § 103(c).
16. See infra notes 78-128 and accompanying text for a legal analysis of
§ 103(c) With respect to VRDBs.
17. See infra notes 78-90, 106-14 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of measures that virtually abrogate the tax-exemption for
VRDBs and a suggested Internal Revenue Service regulation, see infra notes 132-
73.
20. Generally, an industrial development bond (1DB) is a bond that a local
government agency (with an elected body or an appointed authority) issues on
behalf of a private entity for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, or rehabilitating
a capital facility. See Note, Industrial Development Bond Financing After the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984: The Final Chapter? 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 443, 444 (1985)
[hereinafter IDB Financing]; see also Scholl & Jimenez, The Florida Industrial
Development Bond Financing Act: The Need For Judicial Consistency 12 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 31, 32 (1984) [hereinafter Industrial Development Bonds]. For a
further explanation of the typical IDB financing relationship between the local
authority and the private entity, see infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
Section 103(b)(2) of the IRC along with Treasury Regulation § 1.103-7 define
the term "industrial development bond" for federal income tax purposes. See I.R.C.
§ 103(b)(2) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7 (as amended in 1983). Section 103(b)(1)
excludes industrial development bonds from the definition of state and local ob-
ligations in § 103(a) unless they meet certain requirements set forth in the remainder
of § 103(b). See I.R.C. § 103(b) (1985).
21. Originally, the tax-exempt status of interest on municipal bonds was limited
to the financing of essential or legitimate governmental functions, e.g., jails, public
utilities, private housing, college dormitories, roads, and hospitals. See IDB Fi-
nancing, supra note 20, at 446-47. Many states constitutionally prohibited lending
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genres distinct from general obligation bonds22 or revenue bonds. 23
the public credit for the benefit of a private enterprise. See id. at 446. Prior to
1938, state courts, following the "public purpose" doctrine, precluded their states
from issuing bonds for a private purpose. Id. at 447 n.24.
Since this time, however, the definition of an essential function (public purpose)
has expanded to enable states and municipalities to shift to private corporations
part of their burden of providing traditional services by assisting private corporations
with their financing of projects (through IDBs). See id. at 448. For instance, the
interest from IDBs is exempt when the proceeds of the IDBs are used for certain
activities, such as low income residential rental property; sports facilities; convention
or trade show facilities; airports; docks; wharves; mass commuting facilities, in-
cluding parking facilities; sewage and solid waste disposal facilities; facilities for
the local furnishing of water; qualified mass commuting vehicles; or local district
heating or cooling facilities. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4) (1985) (these purposes are
specifically authorized by Congress). Thus, "whether the bonds are issued for
purposes of pollution control, to expand a small manufacturing facility, or for any
other purpose specifically authorized by Congress, the bonds are at that point
legally indistinguishable under federal law from bonds issued by political subdivisions
for schools, roads, water and sewerage systems, or any other traditional public
purpose." ABA Comments, supra note 12, at 4-5 (emphasis in original). The
rationale underlying the exemption, in part, is that the activities exempted are the
type that state or local governments have traditionally undertaken. See IDB Fi-
nancing, supra note 20, at 455.
Currently, many realize that a public- versus private-purpose bond distinction is
unmanageable as a basis for a tax exemption. See Hawthorne, Planning for Ar-
mageddon, INST. INVESTOR, Apr. 1985 at 119, col. 1 [hereinafter Armageddon];
see also Gillette, Fiscal Federalism And The Use Of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1035-39 (1983) (concept of public purpose largely irrelevant
to issue of whether bond issue ought to carry federal tax exemption) [hereinafter
Gillette]. This basis is unmanageable because the definition of a public-purpose
bond has been stretched a bit beyond reason, and because everyone seems to draw
the line at a different point. See Armageddon, supra, at 119, col. 1. The movement
is toward defining public purposes or governmental projects according to who
operates the facilities, not the purpose of the facility or whether the project is
built with municipal bonds. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1986, at B24, col. 4. See
infra note 164 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recently enacted
federal tax legislation that significantly limits the availability of tax-exempt industrial
development bonds to meet infrastructure needs with private development, by
restricting the ownership and operation of facilities by private persons.
22. A general obligation bond is a bond backed by the issuer's full faith and
credit and taxing power. See 15 E. MCQUULLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.05,
at 479 (3d ed. 1970). An unlimited general ad valorem tax on all taxable property
is the most common source of revenue pledged for repayment of general obligation
bonds. See id.; see also Ramsey v. Cameron, 245 S.C. 189, 197, 139 S.E.2d 765,
769 (1965).
23. A revenue bond is a bond secured by specifically dedicated income, usually
revenues generated by the project, but sometimes supplemented by a collateral
revenue source. See, e.g., Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40
N.Y.2d 731, 735, 358 N.E.2d 848, 851 (1976). The people benefiting from the
service financed with revenue bonds pay for it. See IDB Financing, supra note 20,
at 443 n.l. A revenue bond may also be secured by the property acquired with
the bond proceeds. See id. Since the total taxing power of an issuer is not pledged
as security for payment of the bonds, revenue bonds typically bear slightly higher
[Vol. XV
VARIABLE RATE DEMAND BONDS
Rather, VRDBs are an innovative financing technique that may be
used in conjunction with any form of state or local bonds. 24
The following is a model of a VRDB:
The instruments have a fixed term [typically a nominal maturity
of twenty to thirty years]. 25 Holders have the right to "put" them
[at intervals ranging anywhere from five years to one day] on
short notice26 to a remarketing agent who will then try to resell
them.27 If they cannot be resold, a letter of credit will be drawn
upon to pay them off.28 The interest rate floats throughout the
term, within a band of any number of basis points above or
below a stated index, at whatever rate the remarketing agent
periodically determines would be necessary to sell the instruments
at par. 29
interest rates than would the equivalent general obligation bonds. See Eddy, The
Referendum Requirement: A Constitutional Limitation on Local Government Debt
in Florida, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 677, 684 (1984) [hereinafter The Referendum
Requirement].
Although IDBs are most commonly revenue bonds, all IDBs need not be. Industrial
development bonds can come in the form of either general obligations or revenue
bonds. The same is true for bonds issued for traditional public purposes. ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND
FINANCING 37 (Report A-18 1963); see also PUBLIC SECURITIES ASs'N, FUNDAMENTALS
OF MuNIcIPAL BONDS 19 (rev. ed. 1982).
24. See supra note 7.
25. See Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 17, col. 1; Creative Surge, supra note
1, at 212, col. 1.
26. For a brief discussion of notice requirements, see Flexible Tool, supra note
7, at 20 n.3.
27.
[T]he bondholder has the option periodically (at least as often as the
interest rate is adjusted) to tender the bonds to the issuer for repurchase
at par ("tender options"). The "remarketing agent" for the bonds (which
is usually one of the underwriters for the bonds) will attempt to sell to
the public any bonds which have been tendered for repurchase by the
current bondholders.
Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 17, col. 1. See Creative Surge, supra note 1, at
211, col. 3. For simplicity, reference is often made to tender to the issuer, while
in fact tender is made to a tender agent. See Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 20
n.3. For a discussion concerning the substance of this relationship among the issuer,
remarketing agent and the bondholder, see infra notes 120-22 and accompanying
text.
28. See Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 17, col. 1. What makes the tender
option possible is an underlying liquidity facility, normally a bank letter of credit
or other third-party security arrangement, whereby a commercial bank on behalf
of the issuer or the beneficiary agrees to advance funds to the remarketing agent
to purchase any bonds tendered for repurchase. Id.; see Creative Surge, supra note
1, at 212, col. 2. However, the first obligation of the remarketing agent is to find
a new buyer, and, therefore, the letter of credit is not expected to be drawn upon
in a smoothly working transaction.
29. Various approaches are used to fix interest rates on these instruments. In
19871
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VRDBs are mainly an outgrowth of three seemingly negative eco-
nomic forces that have emerged over the past few years.30 First, a
turbulent economy has produced volatile interest rates and an ever-
steeper municipal yield curve.31 Second, governmental fiscal crises32
and the stingy attitude that Congress has shown toward the tax-
exempt market33 have severely undermined the confidence of tax-
exempt investors. Third, reduced profits of banks and property and
casualty insurers, the traditional consumers of municipal instru-
some cases, the rate is adjusted by the issuer periodically in accordance with a
formula, an index, or some other objective standard set forth in the bond indenture-
the formula approach. See Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 18, col. 1. For example,
the indenture may provide for the rate to be set in accordance with one of several
tax-exempt commercial paper indices, a percentage of an index of short-term Treasury
securities, or a percentage of the prime rate of a particular bank. See Reissuance,
supra note 3, at 509; Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 18, col. 1. In other cases, a
remarketing agent or other independent third party has authority to fix the rate at
whatever level is required to resell the instruments at par-the delegation approach.
See Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 17, col. 3 to 18, col. 1.
Having an independent third party make the decisions regarding changes in the
interest rate may be preferable to having the issuer or the beneficiary of the
financing make such decisions. See id. at 18, col. 1. The independent third party
has the necessary expertise to determine, based on prevailing market conditions,
the interest rates on each interest adjustment date and, moreover, is free from
influence of economic interests of the parties. See id. Sometimes the authority to
fix rates is limited to a specified number of points above or below a specified
index. Reissuance, supra note 3, at 509. The former formula approach may also
be used in conjunction with the latter delegation approach. See id. For a discussion
of the delegation problems under state law that the approach used to fix rates
may raise, see id. at 17, col. 3 to 18, col. 2.
30. See Creative Surge, supra note 1, at 211, col. 1.
31. See id. at 211, col. 1; id. at 222, col. 3; Reissuance, supra note 3, at 509.
32. A municipal bond investor, like any prudent lender, takes into consideration
the creditworthiness of an issuer before investing. An analysis of the creditworthiness
of an issuer of general obligation bonds concentrates on the issuer's financial health
and potential taxing power. See The Referendum Requirement, supra note 23, at
684. Cleveland's bond default, New York City's financial crisis, and the Washington
Public Power Supply System debacle are a few examples of fiscal crises that have
caused investors to be more wary. See id. at 677; Creative Surge, supra note 1,
at 211, col. 1; see also Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
33. See Creative Surge, supra note 1, at 211, col. 1; id. at 222, col. 3. At
present, the only legal basis for the exemption of interest on state and local
obligations from federal income tax is found in section 103(a) of the IRC. See
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1825. A body of authority, however, stemming from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
aff'd on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), holds that it would be unconstitutional
for the federal government to tax interest earned on state and local obligations.
See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1825-26. Proponents of this view contend that the
tax exemption has a constitutional basis, both in the reciprocal immunity doctrine
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and in the federal system of government under which the federal government does
not interfere with powers and affairs of local governments. See SEcURITIES INDUSTRY
Ass'N, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 115-19 (9th ed. 1972).
On the other hand, the United States Treasury has been challenging the principle
of state and local governments' constitutional immunity from federal taxation for
decades. See Armageddon, supra note 20, at 116, col. 1. The better reasoned view
is that there are simply no constitutional underpinnings for the municipal bond
interest tax exemption and, therefore, the federal government does have a consti-
tutional right to tax the interest on state and local obligations.
In the first place, since 1913, Congress has repeatedly overlaid restrictions on
the section 103(a) tax exemption afforded municipal bonds. See, e.g., Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (placing extirpative restrictions and limitations
on the issuance of IDBs by placing cap on amount of bonds that can pay for
student loans, waste disposal, docks and other projects serving a mixture of public
and private interests); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(imposing restrictions that apply to all § 103 obligations and specific restrictions
that apply solely to IDBs); Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-364, § 107(a), 82 Stat. 251, 266-68 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.) (divesting IDBs of the general-tax exemption accorded interest
on state and local obligations). To give in anywhere is to give in on the basic
principle of state and local governments' constitutional immunity from federal
taxation. See Armageddon, supra note 21, at 119, col. 1.
In the second place, Pollock is no longer good law. For an excellent analysis
leading to the inescapable conclusion that nothing remains of the intergovernmental
burden theory established in Pollock, see South Carolina v. Regan, 104 S. Ct.
1107, 1128-36 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). But see
1DB Financing, supra note 20, at 468-70.
In the third place, Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution specifically
delegates to Congress the "[p]ower [t]o lay and collect [t]axes." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8. The sixteenth amendment removes any possible ambiguity concerning the
scope of the power to be exercised by Congress by conferring a federal power to
tax "incomes, from whatever source derived." See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
Therefore, any notion that the federal tax exemption for municipal bond interest
is supported by the tenth amendment or any other constitutional basis is clearly
inconsistent with the plain language of the Constitution. See South Carolina, 104
S. Ct. at 1129 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
In the final analysis, simply no considerations of a constitutional proportion
underlie the present municipal bond interest exemptions. See B. BrrTKER, L. STONE
& W. KLEIN, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION 282 (6th ed. 1984) (citing Comment,
Intergovernmental Tax Immunities: An Analysis and Suggested Approach to the
Doctrine and Its Application to State and Municipal Bond Interest, 15 VILL. L.
REV. 414 (1970) (constitutional barrier now seems to be insubstantial)) [hereinafter
BITTKER]. Rather, the exemptions are at best an act of legislative grace (i.e., the
exemption of interest on state and local government bonds from federal income
taxation should be deemed a privilege) based on a number of policy reasons. See
Note, The Limited Tax-Exempt Status of Interest on Industrial Development Bonds
Under Subsection 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1649,
1652-53 n.24 (1972) [hereinafter Exempt Status]. It is upon this assumption that
the Treasury Department, with the encouragement of President Reagan, has pursued
with a renewed vigor its efforts to constrict the use of tax-exempt bonds. See infra
note 164 for a discussion of the progress of these efforts and some of the cogent
policy objections to the tax exemption for IDBs.
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ments,34 have decreased their demand for tax-exempt bonds.35 Because
VRDBs, however, enable issuers to take advantage of the municipal
yield curve and to secure new sources of funds by providing greater
liquidity to investors, the effects of these forces have been mitigated.3 6
With the interest rate floating-that is, changing at frequent in-
tervals-these instruments are the functional equivalent of short-term
debt." The bondholder, knowing that the interest rate will be adjusted
periodically to a current market rate and that the bonds will maintain
their value at or about par on each interest adjustment date, is
willing to accept a substantially lower rate of interest than the
bondholder would for fixed rate bonds with a comparable maturity.38
Thus, the issuer gets the advantage of paying short-term rates while
it retains the protection against tax law changes normally provided
by long-term financing.3 9
On the other side of the transaction, the investors get, in reality,
a short-term instrument with the option of retaining it for twenty
to thirty yearsA° The tender option provides investors, who are
34. It has been estimated that banks own 45 to 5007 of all tax-exempt bonds;
insurance companies account for another 10 to 15%. See G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAX REFORM: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAm? 53 (1975). The beneficiaries of tax-
exempt bonds are higher tax-bracket individuals and entities. See Surrey, Tax Trends
and Bond Financing 22 TAX LAW. 123, 126 (1968) [hereinafter Tax Trends]. Tax-
exempt bonds pay a lower rate of interest than do taxable bonds, because people
buying tax-exempt bonds are willing to accept a lower rate in order to obtain the
exemption. See BITTKER, supra note 33, at 274.
For example, suppose the taxable rate of interest is 1007 and the tax-exempt
rate of interest is 7%. For a person taxed at a marginal rate of 50% on an
investment of $100,000, the after-tax return on the taxable investment will be $5,000,
while the after-tax return on the tax-exempt investment will be $7,000. Such an
investor saves $2,000 in taxes by buying the tax-exempt, whereas a taxpayer in a
30% marginal tax-bracket would come out the same on either alternative. See id.
at 275.
35. Creative Surge, supra note 1, at 212, col. 1. Since 1981, a fundamental
change in the profile of the municipal security buyer has occurred. See id.
36. See id. at 211.
37. Reissuance, supra note 3, at 509; see also 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (1985)
(variable rate bonds, unlike fixed rate bonds, may be purchased by tax-exempt
"money market" funds which, otherwise, would be restricted to the purchase of
tax-exempt notes).
38. Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 17, col. 1; see Creative Surge, supra note
1, at 212, col. 2 (Utah's Intermountain Power Agency was able to obtain nine
and nine and one-half percent whereas had it been fixed rate bonds, rate would
have been closer to eleven and three-quarters percent).
39. Creative Surge, supra note 1, at 212, cols. 1-2. Unlike long-term debt, short-
term debt is susceptible to the dangers of IRC revisions. See Reissuance, supra
note 3, at 511. What is eligible for tax-exempt financing today may not be eligible
a few years or even months hence. See id.
40. Creative Surge, supra note 1, at 212, col. 2.
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worried about the security of long-term bonds and unpredictable
interest rates, with greater flexibility.4 1 This added liquidity is another
reason VRDBs carry a lower interest rate. 42 Finally, the features of
VRDBs have enabled municipal issuers to tap new sources of funds. 43
VRDBs are appealing to retail buyers and large corporations, whose
paramount objective as investors-after safety and yield-is liq-
uidity."4
Thus, from the standpoint of the municipal issuers, investors, and
investment bankers, VRDBs are a welcome innovation in the tax-
exempt market.45 This is evidenced, in part, by the burgeoning volume
of this type of debt. 46 Municipal issuers are able to take advantage
of lower interest costs and new pockets of money, 47 investors are
docked in the safe haven of greater liquidity, 48 and investment bankers
naturally benefit from the increased need for bond issuance services.'19
III. Limitations: IRC Section 103(c)-Arbitrage Bonds
"Arbitrage is the practice of acquiring property in one market
and simultaneously disposing of it in another, with a view to profiting
from a difference in prices exceeding transaction costs." 50 IRC section
103(a), which exempts interest on municipal obligations from federal
income tax, has created a separate financial market in which state
and local governments can borrow at an artificially low price, taking
taxable yields as the norm." Since these governments also have access
to taxable money markets as investors, the tax exemption places
them in the unique position of being able to earn a form of arbitrage
profit by borrowing at tax-exempt interest rates and investing the
borrowed funds in taxable obligations or equity securities.12
41. See id. at 212, cols. 1-2.
42. See id. at 212, cols. 2-3.
43. See id. at 211, col.' 2 to 212, col. 1.
44. See id. at 212, cols. 1, 3.
45. See id. at 222, col. 3.
46. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 37-39, 42-44 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
49. Investment bankers play a key role in the underwriting and remarketing of
variable rate debt. Creative Surge, supra note 1, at 212, col. 2 (number of basis
points goes to remarketing agent on put bonds, usually bank selling issue); see supra
notes 27, 29 and accompanying text. Commercial banks also benefit from the
increased demand for the underlying liquidity facility. See Creative Surge, supra
note 1, at 212, col. 2; supra note 28 and accompanying text.
50. Peaslee, The Limits of Section 103(c): Municipal Bond Arbitrage After the
Invested Sinking Fund, 34 TAX L. REV. 423 (1979) [hereinafter Limits of Section
103(c)].
51. See id.
52. See id.
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As an illustration, suppose a city needs a $10 million sewer
improvement. A municipal officer plans a $100 million thirty-year
serial bond issue, at five percent. Ten million dollars of this issue
will be used to build the sewers and $90 million will be invested in
6% United States Treasury bonds. The city will pledge the fed-
eral bonds and the interest to be earned to secure the municipal
issue. The higher interest rate available on the federal bonds will
enable the city to pay the $10 million cost of the sewers entirely
with the interest earned on the federal bonds-"the arbitrage between
the two interest rates is buying the sewers." 53
At first blush, this may seem to be a very sensible means of
financing, and even one that ought to be encouraged. After all, a
city would be able to provide valuable services and programs at no
cost."' In turn, the city's savings would be passed on to its taxpayers.
But what if the municipal officer decides not to stop there, and
wants to issue another $100 million bond issue, invest all of it in
federal bonds, and use the interest differential to help defray op-
erating expenses of the city? And why stop at $100 million; why
not issue as many municipal bonds and buy as many federal bonds
as possible?
Herein lies the crucial distinction between arbitrage profit and
interest saving. The principal intention of IRC section 103(a) is to
benefit states and localities by reducing their borrowing costs-i.e.,
interest savings." Although arbitrage profit would arguably reduce
the borrowing costs, 5 6 the difference is that arbitrage transactions
are not self-limiting in terms of either size or frequency. 7 In other
words, arbitrage transactions are purely financial transactions whose
volume is not tied to the capital requirements of state or local
governments. 8 The only limit on the amount of municipal arbitrage
53. See Tax Trends, supra note 34, at 124.
54. See id.
55. See Tax Adjustment Act of 1968: Hearings on H.R. 15414 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1968) (letter from Assistant Secretary
Surrey to Sen. Long, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., testimony of S. Surrey)
[hereinafter 1968 Hearings]. The recognized purpose of the section 103(a) exemption
has been to aid state and local governments by allowing them to issue marketable
bonds at interest rates below those of corporate and federal securities. See 113
CONG. REc. S31,611 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1967) (statement of Senator Abraham
Ribicoff); see also Note, Arbitrage Bonds: Reviving The Regulation Roundabout,
3 VA. TAX REv. 369 (1984) [hereinafter Regulation Roundabout].
56. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of how issuing
municipal bonds for the purpose of earning arbitrage profit might have the exact
opposite effect.
57. Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 50, at 424.
58. See id. at 428.
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bonds that could be issued would be the amount of federal bonds
or other securities or obligations available.5 9
This problem was very real for the United States Treasury during
the 1960's. 60 Indeed, some state and local governments had misused
their tax exemption privilege by engaging in arbitrage transactions
in which the funds from tax-exempt issues were employed to purchase
higher yielding federal obligations whose interest was not taxed in
their hands. 61 Typically, such bonds guaranteed their holders that
the proceeds would be kept invested in federal securities. 62 An analysis
of these transactions indicates that the bonds issued by the local
government were simply a conduit to investment in the federal
obligations. 63 Therefore, an individual who purchased a state or local
security under such an arbitrage arrangement had the advantage of
a tax-exempt security with the safety of a federal security. s4 The
federal government then found itself in the position of being an
unintended source of revenue for state and local governments while
having lost the opportunity to tax the interest income from its own
taxable bond issues. 65
In 1969, in order to curb this abuse, Congress enacted IRC section
103(C), 66 which provides in its pertinent parts:
(c) Arbitrage.-
(1) Subsection (a)(1) or (2) not to apply to arbitrage bonds
[i.e., no tax exemption]i-Except as provided in this subsection,
any arbitrage bond shall be treated as an obligation not described
in subsection (a)(1) or (2).
(2) Arbitrage Bond. 67-For purposes of this subsection, the
term "arbitrage bond" means any obligation which is issued as
59. See Tax Trends, supra note 34, at 124.
60. See id.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 173, reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1826; S. REP. NO. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
219, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2254. States and
their political subdivisions are not subject to being taxed by the federal government.
See I.R.C. § 115 (1985).
62. See Tax Trends, supra note 34, at 124.
63. See id.
64. See supra note 61.
65. See id.
66. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 601(a), 83 Stat. 487, 656
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (formerly designated
subsection (d)).
67. "Arbitrage bonds are otherwise tax-exempt obligations." Regulation Roun-
dabout, supra note 55, at 369.
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part of an issue all or a major portion of the proceeds of which
are reasonably expected to be used directly or indirectly-
(A) to acquire securities . . . or obligations . . . which may
be reasonably expected at the time of issuance of such issue, to
produce a yield over the term of the issue which is materially
higher ... than the yield on obligations of such issue, or
(B) to replace funds which were used directly or indirectly
to acquire securities or obligations described in subparagraph (A).68
The reasons offered- for the legislative action reflect the policies
IRC section 103(c) embodies. First, it is believed that arbitrage bonds
serve no useful governmental purpose and yet compete in the tax-
exempt market with bonds issued to finance legitimate public needs.
69
The effect of these bonds is that they tend to increase public
borrowing costs and crowd out weaker public borrowers.70 Second,
arbitrage bonds arguably are not, in substance, obligations of a state
or locality, but merely represent participation interests in the pool
of taxable securities underlying the bonds.7 Third, arbitrage bonds
cause loss of federal revenue and therefore erode the federal tax
base. 72
68. I.R.C. § 103(c)(1), (2)(A), (B) (1985).
69. See Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 50, at 425; see also 1968 Hearings,
supra note 55, at 91 (arbitrage bonds represent clear distortion of basic purpose of in-
terest exemption; therefore, Treasury Department is unable to perceive any conceivable
justification for extending tax exemption to such bonds). Although arbitrage profits
might be spent for equally legitimate public needs or might have a bearing on the
needs of potential tax-exempt bond issuers, the long-term consequences will damage
the bond market and run counter to the interest of municipalities. 43 Fed. Reg.
39,822 (1978).
70. See Regulation Roundabout, supra note 55, at 370-73; supra note 6.
71. See Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 50, at 425. Arbitrage bonds can
be fully secured with the investments they are used to acquire and, hence, the
creditworthiness of the issuer is not a factor. As a result, questions have been
raised about whether such bonds in reality are obligations of a state or local
government. See id. at 424; 113 CoNG. REC. S31,613 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1967)
(statement of Senator Abraham Ribicoff) ("profit [from arbitrage bonds] is claimed
on the sole ground that the local government lends its name to a security-without
assuming any risk, or responsibility, or work, or anything else"); supra notes 57-
58 and accompanying text. But see Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 50, at 425
(application of section 103(c) may not depend on whether the local governments'
credit is on the line). In enacting IRC section 103(c), Congress was clearly concerned
that states and municipalities might act as "conduits" to turn taxable investments
into nontaxable ones. State of Washington v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 128, 135
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
• 72. Arbitrage bonds cost the federal government more than they benefit state
and local governments, which results in a net loss to the federal taxpayer. Statement
of Donald Lubick, Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Tax Policy) on S.3370 (Aug.
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Furthermore, several elements of the legislative history73 shed light
on the issue of whether to treat VRDBs as arbitrage obligations.
In particular, it is important to recognize that the primary purpose
of IRC section 103(c) is to eliminate the profit element that permeates
the use of arbitrage bonds. 74 Moreover, the legislative history evinces
a legislative purpose to broaden the scope of the provision beyond
the relatively narrow categories specifically described in the agency
release, which initially prompted congressional action. 75 The broad
language of the section, when read in the context of its legislative
history, reflects a purpose to prevent avoidance of the statute through
24, 1978) (reprinted in BNA Tax Management Portfolio); see also Regulation
Roundabout, supra note 55, at 370. The House Report on the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 pointed out that arbitrage bonds tend to cause a loss of federal revenue
when municipalities invest their bond proceeds in taxable federal securities. See
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 173, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1826-27; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. A
federal revenue loss is also attributable to the fact that income tax on the entire
interest on a taxable obligation is lost when a tax-exempt bond is issued instead.
See Tax Trends, supra note 34, at 126 n.*, 129 n.*. The buyer of the tax-exempt
bond must forego a taxable investment to be able to buy the tax-exempt bond.
See id.
73. For a thorough review of the congressional deliberations concerning the
enactment of section 103(c), see State of Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.
656, 666-68 (1981), aff'd, 692 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
74. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172-74, reprinted in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1825-28; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 219-20, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2254-
55; see also State of Washington, 77 T.C. at 668 (Congress recognized that its
primary objective should be to eliminate "profit" element which permeates use of
arbitrage bonds), aff'd, 692 F.2d at 135 (curtailing arbitrage profits was main
concern of section 103(c)'s sponsors). See generally Regulation Roundabout, supra
note 55, at 369.
75. City of Tucson, Ariz. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 767, 777 (1982). In August
of 1966, when the arbitrage bond problem was first officially addressed, the Treasury
Department announced, in Technical Information Release 840, that it would decline
to rule on certain municipal obligations when "a principal purpose is to invest the
proceeds of tax exempt obligations in taxable obligations, generally United States
Government securities, bearing a higher interest yield." Tech. Info. Rel. 840 (Aug.
11, 1966), reprinted in 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 6701. More specifically,
Technical Information Release 840 described two categories of arbitrage bonds to
which the policy applied:
(1) Where all or a substantial part of the proceeds of the issue (other
than normal contingency reserve such as debt service reserves) are only
to be invested in taxable obligations which are, in turn, to be held as
security for the retirement of the obligations of the governmental unit.
(2) Where the proceeds of the issue are to be used to refund outstanding
obligations which are first callable more than five years in the future,
and in the interim, are to be invested in taxable obligations held as
security for the satisfaction of either the current issue or the issue to
be refunded.
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manipulation of the form of municipal borrowing in such a way as
to create arbitrage profits. 76 In order to implement the purposes of
IRC section 103(c), the Treasury Department has been delegated a
broad grant of regulatory authority. 7
IV. Application and Implications of IRC Section 103(c) With
Respect to VRDBs
Whether an obligation is an arbitrage bond under IRC section
103(c) depends upon the issuer's reasonable expectations as of the
date of issuance regarding the use of proceeds. 78 Generally, an
obligation is not an arbitrage bond if, based on the issuer's reasonable
expectations on the date of issuance, the proceeds will not be invested
in a materially higher yielding security. 79 In this regard, the issuer
Congress' decision to deal with the problem of arbitrage bonds in terms of
comparison of "yield" suggests that section 103(c) is not confined within a "conduit"
frame of reference such as that expressed in Technical Information Release 840.
See State of Washington, 77 T.C. at 668-69. Confining section 103(c) would dilute
the accomplishment of the main objective of eliminating the profit element of
arbitrage bonds. See id.
76. See City of Tucson, 78 T.C. at 778; see also Regulation Roundabout, supra
note 56, at 379-83.
77. "The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this subsection." I.R.C. § 103(c)(7) (1985). As originally passed
by the House of Representatives, section 103(c) simply denied tax-exempt status to
arbitrage bonds; it failed to define the term "arbitrage bond" but gave broad
authority to the Treasury Department to prescribe regulations defining such term.
See H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (as passed by the House). The Treasury
Department replied that this delegation of authority was too broad, and recom-
mended that the House bill be amended to provide a rule "which may be easily
understood and applied and which furnishes a clearer standard to follow in the
regulations." Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 619 (1969) (statement of Assistant Secretary Cohen, Treasury
Dep't). The Senate Finance Committee acceded to the Treasury's request by rec-
ommending a change in the proposed legislation so that "arbitrage bonds are
defined." See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 219-20, reprinted in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2027, 2254-55. The Senate ultimately adopted
a provision almost identical to the finally enacted section 103(c). See H.R. 13270,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (as passed by the Senate).
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(2) (1979).
79. See id. The regulations provide that the yield produced by the acquired
obligations is materially higher than the yield produced by an issue of governmental
obligations if the yield produced by the acquired obligations exceeds the yield
produced by the issue of governmental obligations by more than one-eighth of one
percentage point or, in a special instance, one-half of one percentage point. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(5) (1979). Also, the regulations define yield to be "that
yield which when used in computing the present worth of all payments of principal
and interest to be paid on the obligation produces an amount equal to the purchase
price." Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(c)(1)(ii) (1979). See Regulation Roundabout, supra
note 55, for a discussion of the method for computing yield and the treatment of
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must calculate the yield on its bonds and compare it with the yield
on the securities or obligations that are to be or were purchased
with the proceeds allocable to the bonds issued.80 If the latter yield
is materially higher than the former, the entire issuance by the
municipality is taxable. 1
This analysis is not easily adapted to the case of VRDBs because
the interest rate on the bonds is constantly changing. 2 Accordingly,
the issuer can not predict the yield on its bonds with any degree
of certainty until some time well into the term of the issue-probably
closer to the time the issue is retired.83 Thus, the VRDB issuer may
well be precluded from having any reasonable expectations as of
the date of issuance regarding the use of the proceeds.8 4
Nevertheless, municipalities continue to issue VRDBs that pay
short-term interest rates (e.g., four to seven percent) as opposed to
the long-term rates (e.g., nine to twelve percent) usually associated
with traditional fixed rate instruments, and yet use the nominal long-
term rate for yield comparison purposes. 5 Furthermore, VRDB hold-
ers may either elect to retain the bonds for a short-term and exercise
the put or, in the alternative, hold the bonds until maturity or
somewhere in between.8 6
Although Congress could not foresee all of the forms which
issuer discounts, administrative costs and other elements. At the very least, it should
be noted that the yield is not merely equal to the rate of interest of the VRDBs
as determined-there is a distinction between yield and interest rate.
80. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(2) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(1) (1979).
81. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(l), (2) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(1) (1979). An
arbitrage obligation is not treated as a tax-exempt state or local government bond
and all interest is taxable from the date of the issuance of the bond. See id. See
infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new arbitrage
rules that create an exception to the general rule by allowing such bonds to enjoy
a tax-exempt status if a special tax or rebate is paid to the United States.
82. See Committee on Tax Exemption of Obligations, Neil P. Arkuss, Chairman,
New Federal Tax Legislation Affecting Tax-Exempt Obligations, 16 URB. LAW.
805, 811 (1984) [hereinafter Tax-Exempt Obligations].
83. See id.; see also Thomas, An Analysis Of The New Industrial Development
Bond Rules, at 24 (available Aug. 13, 1984, on LEXIS, FTX library, 24 TN 691)
[hereinafter New 1DB Rules].
84. See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(2)(i)-(v) (1979).
85. Telephone interview with Michael K. De Chiara, Esq., Associate with Brown
& Wood, New York City (Oct. 15, 1985); see, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 51
(tombstone advertisement for Metropolitan Transportation Authority adjustable rate
refunding obligations); see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; infra
notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. This raises the question
whether VRDBs should be treated or viewed as short-term obligations or as long-
term obligations for tax purposes. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text
for an attempted resolution of this problem.
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arbitrage might take, 7 VRDBs should still fall squarely within the
ambit of arbitrage bonds as defined by IRC section 103(c)(2). 8 Most
significantly, the potential source of arbitrage profits created by
VRDBs is exactly the profit element that the broad language of IRC
section 103(c) was designed to curtail.89 Therefore, this profit element
should cause VRDBs to be characterized as arbitrage bonds under
IRC section 103(c)(2). 90 In addition, VRDBs cannot fit conceptually
into any of the exceptions to IRC section 103(c)(2). 91 More specif-
ically, neither the exercise of the put nor the interest adjustments
should constitute a reissuance of the bond; to characterize them as
such might cause VRDBs to fall within the purview of IRC section
103(c)(4)(A), which arguably excepts short short-term obligations
from being treated as arbitrage bonds.92
A. A VRDB is an Arbitrage Bond Under Section 103(c)(2)
As stated above, the conventional test for characterizing an ob-
ligation as an arbitrage bond under IRC section 103(c) turns on the
87. See Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981).
88. See infra notes 93-128 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 50-77 and accompanying text. See infra notes 106-14 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the potential source of arbitrage profits
inextricably intertwined with VRDB transactions.
90. See infra notes 96-97, 106-14 and accompanying text.
91. The breadth of the definition of arbitrage bonds is qualified by exceptions
and special rules. I.R.C. § 103(c)(3), (4) (1985). In brief, these provisions define
limited circumstances under which bond proceeds, moneys held for debt service,
and amounts that are part of a reasonably required reserve or replacement fund
may be invested at an unrestricted yield. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.103-14
(1979). Apparently, however, these regulations did not contemplate VRDBs, but
only fixed rate obligations. See generally id.
92. IRC section 103(c)(4) provides, in its pertinent parts:
[A]n obligation shall not be treated as an arbitrage bond solely by reason
of the fact that-(A) the proceeds of the issue . . . may be invested for
a temporary period in securities or other obligations until such proceeds
are needed for the purpose for which such issue was issued ....
I.R.C. § 103(c)(4)(A) (1985).
This subparagraph essentially creates a temporary exemption from the arbitrage
bond definition by permitting a state or local governmental unit to invest the
proceeds of an issue at an unrestricted yield for a temporary period. See id. The
special rules regarding the duration of the temporary period relating to a refunding
issue are contained in Treasury Regulation § 1.103-14(e) (1979). One interpretation
of these rules seems to suggest that the issuer is allowed as a minimum a 30-day
period beginning on the date of issue for each refunding issue. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.103-14(e)(3) (1979) ("the issuer shall be allowed the longer of the temporary
periods determined under paragraph (e)(3)(ii)(A) [a 30-day period] or (B) or (at
the issuer's option) the temporary period determined under paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(C)").
Thus, if VRDBs can be viewed as a continuous rolling over of short-term debt
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issuer's intent with regard to the use of the proceeds. 93 Also noted
was the fact that such a test is inappropriate in the case of VRDBs
because of the fluctuating interest rates and resulting uncertainty in
computing the yield on the instruments. 94 Nonetheless, because the
language of the statute itself is broad enough to encompass trans-
actions involving VRDBs95 and because of the enormous profit po-
tential that is inherent in the instruments, 96 VRDBs violate the
statutory policies of IRC section 103(c) and, therefore, should be
considered arbitrage bonds. 97
The terms "proceeds" and "acquired obligations" both illustrate
the breadth of IRC section 103(c). For example, the definition of
"proceeds" is not limited to the net amounts received by the state
or local governmental units as a result of the sale of the issue. 9
Proceeds also include amounts received by the issuer, namely interest
and dividends, "resulting from the investment of any proceeds of
an issue of obligations in acquired nonpurpose obligations." 99 In
addition, arbitrage bonds exist when it is found that the proceeds
of a bond issuance replace funds invested in materially higher yielding
obligations.1°° Consequently, certain funds, which technically are not
(i.e., a refunding occurs every 30 days or less), then it may be possible to avoid
the arbitrage problems altogether because the proceeds (or transferred proceeds)
would be invested in materially higher yield acquired obligations for a permissible
temporary period.
93. The arbitrage rules depend on reasonably expected yields. See supra notes
78-84 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
97. Telephone interview with Michael K. De Chiara, Esq., Associate with Brown
& Wood, New York City (Oct. 15, 1985).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(2)(i) (1979). Temporary Regulations § 1.103-
15AT(b)(6) extends the statute so that gross proceeds mean all of the following:
(1) original proceeds (as defined in section 1.103-13(b)(2)(i)), (2) investment proceeds
(as defined in section 1.103-13(b)(2)(ii)), (3) transferred proceeds (as defined in
1.103-14(e)(2)(ii)), (4) amounts treated as proceeds of the issue under section 1.103-
13(g) (relating to invested sinking funds), (5) amounts invested in a reasonably
required reserve or replacement fund (as defined in 1.103-14(d)), (6) securities or
obligations pledged as security for payment of debt service on an issue by an
ultimate obligor (or a related person), the issuer, or by a governmental unit of
which the issuer is a part, (7) amounts received with respect to acquired purpose
obligations (e.g., lease payments, repayments of principal), (8) other amounts used
to pay debt service on the issue, and (9) other amounts received as a result of
investing the amounts. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-15AT(b)(6) (1985).
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(2)(ii)(A) (1979).
100. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2)(B) (1985). For a discussion of what is needed for this
replacement to occur, see Thornton, The Limits of Federal Arbitrage Replacement
Theories, 4 PACE L. REv. 81 (1984) [hereinafter Federal Arbitrage].
1987]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
proceeds, are deemed or treated as the proceeds of an issue for the
purpose of determining whether there has been arbitrage.' 0'
Furthermore, the term "acquired obligations," as used in IRC
section 103(c), includes not only the purchase of "federal" obli-
gations, but the purchase of any other type of taxable security or
obligation as well. 102 Thus, "acquired obligations," as defined in
the statute, include: (1) transactions that the state or local govern-
mental unit, for tax purposes, treated as a loan; (2) non-exempt
industrial development bonds or arbitrage bonds issued by the state
or local governmental unit; (3) time or demand deposits; and (4)
contracts between the issuer and another person who is required
personally to discharge any obligation of the issuer.103
In view of the expansiveness of the terms "proceeds" and "ac-
quired obligations," IRC section 103(c)(2) should be readily appli-
cable to virtually any transaction employing VRDBs.'14 To confine
the language of IRC section 103(c) solely to those situations that
prompted Congress to enact the statute-arbitrage transactions in-
volving fixed rate tax-exempt bonds-would be inconsistent with the
underlying purposes of the statute. 105
Finally, given that IRC section 103(c) is applicable and that its
primary objective is to eliminate the profit element in transactions
involving tax-exempt municipal obligations," 6 VRDBs should be clas-
sified as arbitrage bonds under IRC section 103(c)(2) because of the
large profit element that is inherent in such instruments. 07 Consider
the following hypothetical: A state or local government issues VRDBs
and makes the proceeds available to private business concerns located
in the area so that they can build industrial plants. 108 Assume that
the governmental issue is otherwise eligible for tax-exempt status.
101. Federal Arbitrage, supra note 100, at 95.
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(4) (1979); see S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 219-20, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2254-55;
see also City of Tucson, 78 T.C. at 776-77.
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(4)(iii) (1979).
104. See Tax-Exempt Obligations, supra note 82, at 811.
105. See State of Washington v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 656, 668-69 (1981)
(section 103(c) was designed to deal only with legislative concern that arbitrage
profits should be eliminated); supra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 50-77, 105 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text. Many bankers admit that
a number of deals were done for the pure purpose to create arbitrage. See Ar-
mageddon, supra note 21, at 119, col. 1.
108. The issuer may simply lend the borrowed funds to the business directly,
or may lease or sell on an installment basis property financed with such funds.
See Tax Trends, supra note 34, at 125; Industrial Development Bonds, supra note
20, at 34.
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The agreement between the issuer and the private business is or-
dinarily characterized for tax purposes as an obligation acquired
with the proceeds of the bonds and, according to the arbitrage rules,
the yield of such an obligation may not be materially higher than
the yield of the VRDBs.0 9 Under existing rules, however, the yield
is simply not calculable on the governmental floating issue until it
is retired.110 Undoubtedly though, absent a determinable yield on
the governmental issue, the yield on the acquired obligation ap-
proximates the yield on an issue of traditional fixed rate instruments
of a comparable maturity."' It is highly improbable that the interest
actually paid on the VRDBs will produce a yield that is within the
spread limitations. 112
The net result is a governmental issue that was supposedly expected
to produce a permitted yield actually produces an impermissible one.
This is precisely the point at which VRDBs run afoul of section
103(c)(2)."13 Even if the subjective purpose of a transaction is not
solely to produce arbitrage profits, it is still an arbitrage transaction
if the effect produces material amounts of arbitrage.1 4
B. A VRDB Does Not Result in a Reissuance
Essentially, one must ask "three questions in analyzing any reis-
suance problem: (1) has there been a change in terms?; (2) is the
change material?; and (3) does the principle of the conversion rulings
mean there is nevertheless no new issue?""' 5 If the answer to the
109. Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 50, at 426 n.3; see supra note 103 and
accompanying text. In other words, the yield produced by the rental or installment
sale payments obtained from the operating revenues of these concerns is subject
to the arbitrage bond yield limitations.
110. See Tax-Exempt Obligations, supra note 82, at 811; see also supra notes
82-84 and accompanying text.
Ill. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. The theory is that the state
or local government will want to arrange the rental or installment sale payment
schedule to ensure repayment of the principal and interest-whatever it may be-
with respect to the VRDB issue.
112. See Tax-Exempt Obligations, supra note 82, at 811.
113. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
114. See Regulation Roundabout, supra note 55, at 379-83 (section 103(c) intended
to apply to transactions having effect, as well as purpose, of producing arbitrage
supported by principles of statutory construction); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.103-
13(j) (1979) (transactions that attempt to circumvent provisions of section
103(c)-"artifice or device"-constitute arbitrage bond transactions); Note, The
IRS's Application of Arbitrage Provisions. Overregulation of Municipal Finance,
10 FoRDHAm Un. L.J. 659, 661 n.12 (1982) [hereinafter Arbitrage Provisions].
115. See Reissuance, supra note 3, at 527; see also supra notes 91-92 and
accompanying text (explaining significance of this analysis).
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first question is "no," the inquiry ends there; if not, one must
address the remaining questions. 1 6
In determining whether VRDBs result in a reissuance, the analysis
must focus on the interest rate adjustment and the option to put
the bonds. 17 It is true that it might appear as though the remarketing
agents were in substance retiring old paper and selling new paper
each time an investor exercised a put or a remarketing agent reset
an interest rate."' Nevertheless, neither the exercise of the put nor
the remarketing agent's authority to set the interest rate should result
in a reissuance. ' ' 9
With regard to the exercise of the put, the remarketing agent can
be viewed as retiring old paper and selling new paper only if he is
actually the agent of the issuer. 20 A properly structured transaction,
however, avoids anything that hints at the issuer buying and re-
selling.' 2' The put, then, is merely a mechanism for the holder to
dispose of his investment to a third party, rather than a mechanism
for redemption, unless, of course, the remarketing agent is unable
to find a buyer. 22 Thus, the put is basically irrelevant in deciding
whether a reissuance has occurred and the question narrows to
whether the remarketing agent's authority to set the interest rate
creates a reissuance problem. 2 1
Almost instinctively, a person could reasonably conclude that a
change in the rate of interest payable is not really a change in the
terms of the instrument. 24 In the first place, there has been no
physical exchange of the bonds. 21 Moreover, the "new rate" is not
really new in the sense that a provision, embedded in the instrument,
preauthorized the change to this rate from the outset. 26 In a simple
situation such as this, a variation in the interest rate should not be
a change in terms. 27 Accordingly, VRDBs do not qualify for the
116. See Reissuance, supra note 3, at 527.
117. See id.; Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 18.
118. See Reissuance, supra note 3, at 531.
119. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
120. See Reissuance, supra note 3, at 531.
121. See id. at 532.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 527.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Tax Analysis of "Reissue" Questions Arising From Changes in Bond
Terms 10 (undated) (unpublished memorandum available from National Association
of Bond Lawyers, Committee on General Federal Tax Matters); see also Reissuance,
supra note 3, at 532.
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IRC section 103(c)(4)(A) exception because their operation does not
result in a reissuance. 21
V. The Need for the Internal Revenue Service to Issue Rules
Municipal issuers currently believe that they have adapted their
VRDBs to conform to the regulations.129 Yet VRDBs exploit the
interest differential between tax-exempt and taxable securities and
obligations, to achieve a material financial advantage-increased
arbitrage profits. 30 Accordingly, the Treasury Department should
take steps to enforce the congressional view that municipal bond
arbitrage via VRDBs is a serious abuse of the tax exemption. 3'
A. Alternative Resolutions
One approach that the Internal Revenue Service might take is to
promulgate rules for forecasting the yield based on present as-
sumptions. 3 2 This approach, however, is so fatally flawed that it
does not warrant elaboration on the mechanics to make it work.
Axiomatically, there are no experts on the future. The potential
source of arbitrage profit would still exist.' 33 At best, the potential
profit margin would be reduced slightly. Tolerance of any profit,
no matter how slight, is clearly inconsistent with the legislative fiat
to eliminate all profits. 3 4
Another approach that has been suggested requires a look-back
to the yield actually produced over a prior period.'35 Presumably,
the theory is that the yield actually produced over a prior period
128. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
129. See Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 17, col. 2 (legal counsel have devised
acceptable approaches to many problems).
130. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
132. See Tax-Exempt Obligations, supra note 82, at 811.
133. Absent a determinable yield on the VRDBs, the ceiling yield (i.e., the
maximum permissible yield of the acquired obligation) will still be an approximation,
although some will be better than others. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying
text.
134. See Regulation Roundabout, supra note 55, at 376-83 (criticizing Tax Court's
decision in State of Washington, holding primary intent of section 103(c) was not
to eliminate all arbitrage from municipal bond offerings). The drafters did provide
special rules and exceptions regarding temporary investments, minor proceed in-
vestments, and reserve fund investments which do permit some arbitrage effects.
See supra note 91. The reference to "arbitrage profit" in the context of this
discussion is intended to refer only to the overage of these permissible arbitrage
effects.
135. Tax-Exempt Obligations, supra note 82, at 811.
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could be used in any one of three ways. 3 6 One way would be to
use this yield as a basis to predict the yield for the next period. 3 7
A second way would be to use this yield as the comparative yield
for the acquired obligations in a future period of the same duration. 38
A third way to use the yield actually produced over a prior period
is to use it as a sort of monitoring device.' 39 Regardless of which me-
thod is used, however, this approach suffers from the same defects of
the aforementioned approach.'"" This approach is in fact nothing more
than a periodic review to check whether there is a potential non-
compliance with the arbitrage rules.' 4' The potential for non-com-
pliance is very real. 142 The consequences of this non-compliance-
loss of the tax exemption for the bond issue-could be catastrophic.
An additional disadvantage common to each variation of this ap-
proach is that it requires an impracticable policing and continuous
supervision by the municipal issuer and also the IRS. 143
A third approach is analogous to the 1984 amendment to the
arbitrage rules in paragraph 6 of section 103(c).'" This amendment
provided that arbitrage profit earned on investments that are not
acquired in order to carry out a government purpose must be paid
136. See id.
137. See id. For instance, assume that at the end of the first bond year the
weighted average rate of interest for the first year is a rate of 7%. The yield could
then be calculated assuming a rate of 7% over the life of the obligations. See
Clarifications in Regulations, supra note 12, at 9-11, for other ways to use the
weighted average rate and for the effects of the weighted average rate of interest
in subsequent periods.
138. For example, the weighted average rate of interest for period year one
would be used to establish the maximum permissible yield of the acquired obligations
during period year two. In turn, the weighted average rate of interest for period
year two would form the basis for the maximum permissible yield of the acquired
obligations during period year three, so on and so forth. In addition to the problem
with this method at the beginning of issuance (no weighted average rate of interest
to use for period year one), see infra note 142 for another problem.
139. See Tax-Exempt Obligations, supra note 82, at 811-12; infra notes 141-42
and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
141. See id.
142. It is inconceivable that a municipal issuer could invest and divest in acquired
obligations in order to parallel the fluctuations of the weighted average rate of
interest and the yield produced thereby from period to period.
143. For a discussion of the problems that the IRS currently faces in auditing
municipal issuers, see Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 50, at 429.
144. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(6) (1985). The requirements of section 103(c)(6) apply
to IDBs other than obligations described in section 103(b)(4), relating to projects
for residential rental property, and housing program obligations issued under section
11(b) of the Housing Act of 1937. See H.R. ReP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1696, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 697, 1319.
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to the federal government. 4 ' At least every five years, an issuing
authority must rebate ninety percent of the arbitrage earned to that
date to the federal government with any remaining balance paid
thirty days after the bonds are retired. 46 Similarly, an issuer might
be permitted to prevent its VRDBs from becoming an arbitrage bond
by rebating all of the arbitrage profit earned to the United States. 147
The beauty of this last method is its exactness and certainty-the
municipal issuers can not make any arbitrage profit. 148 At least two
major drawbacks, however, diminish the efficacy of this approach.
First, the rebate merely shifts the impermissible profit to the federal
government. 49 Second, after a rebate calculation is made, and the
payment of the rebate is made to the United States, rates on the
bonds may increase to the point at which, had the increase been
known or predicted, less rebate would have been payable. 50 The
question arises whether the United States would be required to rebate
the rebate under such circumstances.' 5'
B. Recommendations
From the foregoing analysis, one may perceive that any rule that
145. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(6)(D)(ii) (1985). Section 103(c)(6) supplements the general
provisions of section 103(c)(4) and related regulations, which define the circumstances
under which bond proceeds and moneys held for debt service may be invested at
an unrestricted yield during various temporary periods or as part of reasonably
required reserve funds. See ABA Comments, supra note 12, at 3; supra note 91. The
new rules are supplemental to the existing arbitrage rules. Paragraph six does not.
allow issuers to earn arbitrage profit in addition to the permitted spreads as long
as they do not retain any arbitrage earned. See New IDB Rules, supra note 83,
at 25 (rule does not excuse violation of old rules limiting amount of arbitrage
that may be earned and excess earnings still disqualify a bond, even if earnings
rebated); H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1205-06, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1893-94; see also supra note 134. Rather, the
issuers are no longer allowed to retain any arbitrage earned and the amendment
does not prevent an IDB from becoming an arbitrage bond if the spread limitations
are violated. See New IDB Rules, supra note 83, at 25 (new rule requires that
certain arbitrage profits which previously could have been retained to be passed
on to federal government and failure to comply results in bond losing exempt
status); H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1205-06, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1893-94.
146. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(6)(E) (1985).
147. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. Note that this approach is
a departure from I.R.C. § 103(c)(6) in that, as long as the money is rebated, the
IDBs would not lose their tax-exempt status even though the arbitrage exceeds the
limits set by Congress.
148. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(6)(D), (E) (1985).
149. See supra note 147.
150. Tax-Exempt Obligations, supra note 82, at 811.
151. See id.
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attempts to keep the tax exemption for VRDBs intact is potentially
inequitable.5 2 This Note, therefore, proposes two changes in the
current law concerning VRDBs.
The first change is to disallow the exemption from federal income
tax for VRDBs when the bonds are issued by a state or local
governmental unit to finance certain exempt activities,'53 to finance
industrial parks, 154 or as part of an exempt small issue.'55 The
justification for this disallowance is simple and logically sound. The
purpose of the tax exemption is to benefit states and localities by
reducing their borrowing costs.5 6 The proposed change does not bar
the use of VRDBs; it only abrogates their tax-exempt status.'57
Notwithstanding the taxability of VRDBs, municipal issuers would
still be able to achieve lower borrowing costs than with traditional
(fixed rate) long-term instruments that are without the tax exemp-
tion. 5 There is no compelling reason further to enhance municipal
issuers' borrowing ability at the expense of creating the risk of
contravening congressionally determined economic policies.119
The second proposed change is to permit the tax exemption for
VRDBs only when the acquired purpose obligations are analogous
to acquired program obligations as specified in Treasury Regulation
152. See id.; see supra notes 132-51 and accompanying text.
153. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8 (as amended in 1983).
154. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(5) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-9 (as amended in 1977).
155. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6) (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10 (as amended in 1986).
In short, VRDBs of the IDB variety would no longer be eligible for the tax
exemption.
156. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
157. These proposals affect only the tax consequences of VRDBs.
158. The general IRC section 103(a) tax exemption enables municipal issuers to
borrow at two to four percentage points below market interest rates. See BITTKER,
supra note 33, at 274-75. VRDBs enable municipal issuers to borrow at two to
four percentage points below the municipal fixed rate market interest rates. See
supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. Therefore, loss of the tax exemption
for VRDBs should still, theoretically, enable municipal issuers to borrow at two
to four percentage points below market interest rates.
159. One could argue that since one of the underlying rationales of IDBs is to
subsidize indirectly economic development, VRDB/IDB transactions qualify for the
tax exemption as long as the private enterprises reap the full benefit of the subsidy
effect produced by the arbitrage. See Arbitrage Provisions, supra note 114, at 661-
63, 676-81. The arbitrage profit in the hands of the private enterprise would represent
an additional reduction in the private enterprise's cost of financing and therefore
would be consistent with the policy to subsidize. Id. There are at least two grounds
for rejecting this argument. First, the private enterprise would still be making private
profits at the expense of the public. See Tax Trends, supra note 34, at 128-29.
Second, the continuation of the tax-exempt status of IDBs under any rationale is
at best improbable. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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section 1.103-13(h),' 60 or when no securities or obligations are ac-
quired at all.161 It is only in these two instances that there will be
no arbitrage profit. The governmental program exception is inherently
self-limiting and. furthermore lessens the need to make additional
issuances-i.e., purely interest saving. 62 The latter exception enables
the municipal issuer to certify conclusively that the proceeds will
definitively not be invested in materially higher yielding securities
or obligations. 63
These proposed changes will not only comport better with the
entire legislative scheme of tax-exempt bonds,' 64 but will also drast-
160. Section 1.103-13(h) provides, in pertinent parts:
(2) Governmental programs. A governmental program is described in this
subparagraph if-
(i) The program involves the acquisition of acquired purpose obligations;
(ii) At least 90 percent of all such obligations acquired under the
program, by amount of cost outstanding, are evidences of loans to a
substantial number of persons representing the general public, loans to
exempt persons within the meaning of section 103(b)(3), loans to provide
housing and related facilities, or any combination of the foregoing;
(iii) At least 90 percent of all of the amounts received by the governmental
unit with respect to obligations acquired under the program shall be used
for one or more of the following purposes: To pay the principal or
interest or otherwise to service the debt on governmental obligations
relating to the governmental program; to reimburse the governmental
unit, or to pay, for administrative costs of issuing such governmental
obligations; to reimburse the governmental unit, or to pay, for admin-
istrative and other costs and anticipated future losses directly related to
the program financed by such governmental obligations; to make ad-
ditional loans for the same general purposes specified in such program;
or to redeem and retire governmental obligations at the next earliest
possible date of redemption ....
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(h) (1979) (subparagraph (3) provides examples illustrating
governmental programs).
161. This change would leave open the possibility that the municipal issuer may
expend all the proceeds in such a way that no obligations are acquired. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(4) (1979).
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(h)(2), (3) (1979). It is true, however, that bonds
issued as part of an exempt small issue also possess a similar self-limiting quality.
See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6) (1985). At any rate, this sunset legislation will generally
expire in the near future. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(N) (1985).
163. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(a)(2) (1979).
164. See Flexible Tool, supra note 7, at 18, col. 4 (President has proposed, and
Congress is considering, legislation that is part of plan to simplify tax laws,
and if enacted would virtually eliminate tax-exempt financing of private purposes);
Armageddon, supra note 21, at 119, col. 1 (tax-exempt market is facing threat to
its very existence). The thrust of the proposals is to make municipal bonds taxable
if more than a very small percentage (e.g., one percent) of the proceeds is used
by non-governmental persons. See id. at 116.
The position for depriving VRDBs of the tax exemption is quite in accord with
the policy of narrowing the § 103(a) tax exemption. If the day were ever to come
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ically simplify the law, 165 drain the intensive efforts to develop
when the § 103(a) tax exemption was done away with altogether, then the tax-
exempt status of VRDBs would become a moot point. See supra note 67. Although
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has not yet abolished the § 103(a) tax exemption, it
certainly can be seen as a step toward that inevitable destination. See Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 103, 141-150 (to be codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also infra. In addition, the lower tax rates
established by the 1986 Act are likely to sap much of the incentive for investing
in tax-exempt bonds. See id. § 1; see also note 34.
Several considerations lend support to those favoring restrictions on IDBs and
on the federal tax exemption for interest on state and municipal bonds in general.
See New IDB Rules, supra note 83, at 2. See generally Gillette, supra note 21, at
1030-83 (restrictions on tax exemption are appropriate and criticism of restrictions
is misplaced). IDBs are problematic because as their volume increases, the attrac-
tiveness of other exempt bonds diminishes, making the financing of public projects
more expensive. See BITTKER, supra note 33, at 280. Furthermore, as a result of
the complexity of IDB transactions, the costs of issuance render the subsidy to
the funded projects inefficient-" between a quarter and a third of the subsidy goes
to bondholders, underwriters, and bond counsel." See id. at 281.
With respect to the federal tax exemption in general, the subsidy is frequently
criticized as inefficient and inequitable because the subsidy redistributes wealth from
those who reside outside the locality to those who reside inside. See Gillette, supra
note 21, at 1040-49. In addition, local governments have a tendency to enter the
bond market without regard to their collective overuse of the market, and decisions
to issue tax-exempt bonds are often made by officials who are not accountable to
the local residents for the long-term consequences of their decisions. See id. at
1049-71.
Generally, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 continues to provide the basic framework
for governmental bonds reorganized under ten additional sections, numbered from
141 to 150. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). IRC §§ 141-150 impose a number of
new limitations on the receipt of tax-exempt interest. See id.
More specifically, the 1986 Act substitutes "Private Activity Bond" for "In-
dustrial Development Bond," and redefines the key amount of proceeds to be
used in a business of a nongovernmental person by reducing it to ten percent from
twenty-five percent. See id. §§ 103(b), 141(b). A "Qualified Bond" is exempted
from the meaning of "Private Activity Bond" and therefore is tax-exempt. See id.
§§ 103(b)(1), 141(d). Many of the exempt activities under the old IRC § 103(b)(4)
are carried forward in the definition of "exempt facility bond," which is a "Qualified
Bond" classification. See id. §§ 141(d), 142.
The arbitrage provisions have been transplanted to IRC § 148 in a slightly
different form, and some new arbitrage restrictions have been added. See id.
§ 148. Judging by the House Committee Report, Congress has approved of and
adopted substantial portions of the analysis in this Note. See id. § 148(a); [1987]
2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1201, at 15,020-22, 1221.02 (1986). First, the
reasonable expectations test is clarified so that an initial satisfaction of the reasonable
expectations test will not provide an umbrella and protect existing tax-exempt bonds
from being classified as arbitrage bonds. See id. 1201, at 15,021, 1221.02. If
subsequent intentional acts are taken after the date of issue to earn arbitrage, then,
however reasonable the expectations were, the bonds may be taxed. See id. Second,
the House Committee Report explicitly refers to VRDBs as an example of a bond
to which the arbitrage restrictions extend. See id. 1201, at 15,022.
165. See Tax-Exempt Obligations, supra note 82, at 811-12. See Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.103-15AT(c)(4) (1985) for numerous unduly complex provisions and cal-
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advances in arbitrage technology, 166 and resolve several other pressing
problems associated with VRDBs. 167 These changes do not alter the
statute, but rather fulfill it.168 Accordingly, the Treasury can effec-
tuate these proposed changes in a regulation.1 69
The Regulation should of course apply prospectively to all issues
not yet initiated. 170 It should also apply retroactively to the date on
which municipal issuers and bond counsel are deemed to have notice
of consideration of the Regulation by the Treasury. 71 In regard to
issues already outstanding, municipal issuers should be given a rea-
sonable time to bring their issuances into compliance with the reg-
ulations (e.g., by refunding the issue). 72
The following is a proposed Treasury Regulation:
Section 1.103-13 Arbitrage bonds
(k) Variable Rate Demand Bonds. Except as otherwise provided
in this paragraph, a variable rate demand bond shall be treated
as an arbitrage bond as described in section 1.103-13(a). A variable
rate demand bond is defined as any instrument whose yield is
unable to be calculated as of the date of issue due to an adjustable
rate of interest and an option held by the holder to dispose of
the bond at various intervals. 173
culations necessitated by an attempt to have VRDBs comply with the portion of
the statute dealing with nonpurpose obligations. These complexities could all be
obviated.
166. It is doubtful that regulations along the lines of forecasting the yield on
VRDBs could now be issued without regenerating intensive efforts to promote
arbitrage. See Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 50, at 470.
167. See, e.g., supra note 165. Furthermore, certain techniques have evolved in
which fixed rate bonds are used in conjunction with floating rate bonds. See
Shepard, Attorney Asks For Treasury Release Opposing Fixed Rate/Floating Rate
Refunding Issues (available Apr. 9, 1985, on LEXIS, FTX library, 85 TNT 71-
97). These transactions allegedly violate the arbitrage regulations. See id. (discussing
various situations in which these violations occur). Because certain legal coun-
sel are willing to approve these VRDB transactions, law firms that have advised
that VRDBs violate the arbitrage regulations face the imminent prospect of losing
clients. See id.
168. IRC § 103(c) and regulations accompanying this section remain satisfactory
with respect to traditional fixed rate instruments. See Matthew 5:17-18 (The Jeru-
salem Bible).
169. For a discussion of the specific congressional grant of regulatory power to
the Treasury Department and the deference to be accorded to its promulgations,
see Arbitrage Provisions, supra note 114, at 662 n. 18, 679 n. 110; see also Regulation
Roundabout, supra note 55, at 372, 377; supra note 77 and accompanying text.
170. See Limits of Section 103(c), supra note 50, at 427 n.6.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. "The term 'variable rate obligation' means any obligation the yield on
which, under the terms of the obligation, is adjusted periodically according to a
1987l
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(1) A variable rate demand bond shall not be treated as
an arbitrage bond when the proceeds are used directly to acquire
program obligations as described in section 1.103-13(h).
(2) A variable rate demand bond is not an arbitrage bond
if a major portion of the proceeds will not be used to acquire
any obligations described in section 1.103-13(b)(4).
VI. Conclusion
Variable rate demand bonds represent the "never-to-be-underes-
timated fecundity of investment bankers' imagination.' 4 These bonds
are a sophisticated financing device which enable the municipal issuer
to increase arbitrage profits without actually violating the letter of
the current regulations. The federal interest in eliminating this prac-
tice, which undermines the enforceability of the federal tax system
and laws, sufficiently outweighs the modest fiscal burdens such a
measure imposes upon the state and local governments. By issuing
regulations incorporating the above proposals, which abrogate the
tax exemption for VRDBs in all but two select situations, the IRS
can effectively safeguard against municipal profiteering and circum-
scribe the circumvention of section 103(c).
Troy M. Hellenbrand
prescribed formula such that the yield over the term of the obligation cannot be
determined on the date of issue." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-15AT(b)(7) (1985).
174. See Reissuance, supra note 3, at 532.
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